White Collar Criminal Defense Group

No Vacancy for Privacy: Five Hours After Checkout, the Fourth Amendment Checks Out in Pittsburgh

In United States v. Mendoza (2026 WL 61591), the Third Circuit held that a hotel guest does not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room five hours after checkout time, affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of Appellant’s hotel room.

Facts

Ryan Mendoza checked into a Pittsburgh hotel for a two-night stay. Mendoza did not affirmatively checkout at noon on the date of his departure, which was the hotel’s posted checkout time. However, as with most hotels across the country, this hotel’s policy permitted “walk-out” checkout, where a guest can leave without any interaction with the front desk. Pursuant to this policy, on the day of a guest’s scheduled departure, if the guest does not arrange for a late checkout, the keycards are deactivated and charges processed automatically, two hours after checkout time.

At approximately 2:00 p.m., on the day of Mendoza’s departure, hotel staff entered his room as part of routine post-checkout procedure. At that time, they discovered a backpack containing suspected narcotics. At approximately 5:20 p.m., five hours after checkout time, police, accompanied by the hotel manager, entered the room without a warrant.

Mendoza returned to the hotel later that evening and was arrested. He subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that because he never formally checked out and believed he had paid for a two-night stay, he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room for a full 48 hours. He lost.

Timing is Everything: Five Hours Is Too Late

The Third Circuit rejected Mendoza’s argument, holding that any subjective expectation of privacy he may have had was not objectively reasonable once checkout time had passed. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the search occurred five hours after the posted checkout time.

The Court emphasized that while hotel guests generally enjoy Fourth Amendment protection equivalent to that of a tenant, that protection ends when lawful occupancy ends. Checkout time, the Court explained, is a clear and administrable marker for when possession reverts to the hotel. Once that happens, hotel management may consent to police entry.

The Court stressed that this was not a close case. The search occurred five hours after checkout time, there was no communication from Mendoza regarding a late checkout, the hotel’s policies were clear and posted, and the room had already been entered by staff in the ordinary course. Under those circumstances, there can be no reasonable continuing expectation of privacy.

When Might the Result Be Different?

Although the Court ruled decisively on these facts, it identified scenarios that might warrant a different outcome in a future case. These included: 1) whether a guest might retain a reasonable expectation of privacy shortly after checkout time where a hotel has a known practice of allowing late departures; 2) whether hotel-specific customs or patterns could make continued privacy expectations objectively reasonable; and 3) whether express or implied communications between the guest and hotel staff regarding checkout timing could alter the analysis.

The Third Circuit made clear that, absent evidence of a late-checkout agreement, Fourth Amendment standing evaporates quickly after posted checkout times.

You Have The Right To Remain Silent… And Refrain From Giving The Police Your Phone Passcode!

The Third Circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Curry, 2025 WL 2647753, (Sept. 16, 2025) limits the scope of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment protections in the digital age. The Court addressed whether evidence seized from a suspect’s cell phone must be suppressed after police obtained her passcode despite her clear request for counsel.

Case Overview

Defendant Curry was arrested in New Jersey on heroin and fentanyl charges. After being advised of her Miranda rights, she unequivocally invoked her right to counsel. Detectives acknowledged her request, but continued to ask her for the passcode to her cell phone. When Curry resisted, officers warned that if they were forced to obtain a warrant, their search of her phone could potentially erase her phone’s data. She subsequently relented and provided the passcode. Incriminating text messages were recovered from the phone and were used at trial which resulted in Curry’s conviction.

On appeal, Curry argued that both her passcode and the derivative evidence from her phone should have been suppressed under the Fifth Amendment and Edwards v. Arizona (once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, all police-initiated interrogation must cease until counsel is made available.)

The Majority’s Analysis

Judge Matey, joined by Judge Krause, declined to suppress the phone evidence, reasoning that Miranda and Edwards provide prophylactic protections but do not create constitutional rights themselves. The Court went on to state that the Fifth Amendment bars only compelled testimony; whereas here, Curry voluntarily provided her passcode. The Court concluded that since there was no constitutional violation, the exclusionary rule from Wong Sun v. United States (the exclusionary rule extends not only to evidence obtained directly from an unconstitutional act, but also to derivative evidence) did not apply. The Court expressly refused to create a new rule excluding derivative evidence obtained after an Edwards violation.

The Dissent

Judge Restrepo dissented, arguing that once Curry invoked her right to counsel, Edwards made any further questioning a direct Fifth Amendment violation, not a mere procedural misstep. By eliciting her passcode, after a request for counsel, police exploited that violation. Under Wong Sun, both the passcode and the phone’s contents should have been suppressed.

Judge Restrepo highlighted the unique privacy implications of a search of one’s smartphone “the sum of an individual’s private life,” and cautioned that the majority’s approach invites police to ignore invocations of counsel, knowing that the derivative evidence will remain admissible.

Practical Implications

Most Americans routinely carry phones packed with sensitive communications, often blurring the line between personal and professional. Judge Restrepo’s dissent provides a roadmap for future challenges to the admission of cellphone evidence, particularly as the Supreme Court may be called upon to reconcile Edwards, Wong Sun, and modern digital privacy concerns.