White Collar Criminal Defense Group

Compassionate Release Has Limits: The Supreme Court Clarifies the Limitations of § 3582(c)(1)(A)

The Supreme Court recently issued two significant decisions that curtail the scope of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In Rutherford v. United States and Fernandez v. United States, the Court rejected efforts to use compassionate release as a vehicle to obtain relief from lengthy sentences based on subsequent changes in the law or perceived flaws in underlying convictions. Taken together, the decisions reinforce that compassionate release remains a narrow remedy focused primarily on an inmate’s personal circumstances rather than broader concerns about sentencing policy or guilt.

In Rutherford, the Court addressed a recurring issue arising from the First Step Act’s elimination of mandatory ‘stacking’ under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Before the First Step Act, defendants convicted of multiple § 924(c) counts (possession of a firearm during a “crime of violence” or “drug trafficking crime”) in a single prosecution often faced extraordinarily long mandatory sentences. Congress reduced those penalties in 2018 but declined to make the change fully retroactive. Defendant Rutherford argued that the disparity between the sentences they received and the sentences they would receive today constituted an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ warranting compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Barrett concluded that a sentencing disparity created by Congress’s decision not to make a sentencing amendment retroactive cannot itself qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The Court reasoned that nonretroactivity is the norm in federal sentencing and that allowing courts to reduce sentences based on such disparities would undermine Congress’s deliberate choice regarding retroactivity. The Court further held that the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement authorizing relief for certain “unusually long sentences” conflicted with congressional intent and was invalid to that extent.

The same day, the Court decided Fernandez. There, the petitioner sought compassionate release based largely on his claim that he was innocent and that his conviction was unreliable. After losing on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Fernandez attempted to obtain relief through the compassionate release statute. The district court granted relief, expressing doubts about the integrity of the conviction, but the Second Circuit reversed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit. Again, writing for the majority, Justice Barrett held that challenges to the validity of a conviction must proceed through the habeas and post-conviction framework established by Congress, particularly § 2255. According to the Court, allowing defendants to relitigate claims of innocence or trial error through compassionate release motions would permit an end-run around the procedural limitations Congress imposed on collateral attacks. The Court emphasized that compassionate release is intended to address circumstances such as age, illness, family hardship, and rehabilitation, not alleged legal defects in a conviction.

The practical takeaway from Rutherford and Fernandez is straightforward. Compassionate release is not a catch-all equitable remedy. Courts may not use § 3582(c)(1)(A) to revisit Congress’s decisions about retroactivity, nor may they use it to reconsider the validity of convictions that are properly challenged through habeasproceedings. While compassionate release remains an important mechanism for addressing extraordinary personal circumstances, the Supreme Court has made clear that it is not a substitute for legislative reform or post-conviction review.

Going forward, successful compassionate release motions are likely to remain focused on the traditional factors that have historically defined the remedy: age, medical condition, family circumstances, and other individualized hardships.

When Self-Defense Shapes Probable Cause- Third Circuit Raises the Stakes in Kendig v. Stolar

In a significant Fourth Amendment decision, the Third Circuit held in Kendig v. Stolar, 2026 WL 1145264, that law enforcement may, in certain circumstances, be required to include known affirmative-defense evidence in probable cause affidavits submitted in support of arrest warrants.

Case Snapshot

This case arose after Corey Kendig shot and killed a man during a late-night altercation outside a Pennsylvania bar. Kendig claimed that he acted in self-defense after being outnumbered, attacked first, and placed in a chokehold during the confrontation. Surveillance footage and witness accounts supported portions of that account. Despite those facts, the affidavit of probable cause submitted by the investigating trooper did not include any information suggesting Kendig may have acted in self-defense.

Kendig was charged with homicide and related offenses but was ultimately acquitted by a jury. He later filed a Section 1983 action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, arguing that the investigating officer omitted material exculpatory information from the warrant affidavit.

The Holding and Its Limits

The Third Circuit agreed that affirmative-defense evidence can, in some cases, be relevant to probable cause. The Court adopted a middle-ground rule, holding that officers must disclose affirmative-defense evidence when a reasonable officer would “conclusively know” that the defense negates the mens rea of the offense or otherwise excuses the conduct. Applying Pennsylvania law, the Court emphasized that self-defense negated the mental-state elements of the crimes Kendig was charged with, homicide and aggravated assault.

The Court pointed to several allegedly omitted facts, including evidence that Kendig was outnumbered, that another individual initiated the confrontation, that Kendig was placed in a chokehold, and that witnesses described the decedent and his companions as violent and intoxicated.

Despite announcing the above rule, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the trooper on qualified-immunity grounds. The panel concluded that, at the time of the arrest, neither the Third Circuit nor a robust consensus of other courts had clearly established a constitutional requirement that officers include affirmative-defense evidence in warrant affidavits.

Why This Matters

The practical takeaway is clear: officers and prosecutors should expect increased scrutiny of affidavits that omit known exculpatory information bearing on self-defense claims. While Kendig does not impose a blanket requirement to include every potentially favorable fact, it makes clear that law enforcement cannot ignore affirmative defenses that are plainly apparent from the evidence. The decision provides defendants with a potentially important roadmap for challenging arrests and prosecutions based on incomplete probable-cause affidavits.