Appeal Waivers Finally Meet Their Limit
Federal plea agreements routinely require defendants to waive their right to appeal. For years, courts have generally enforced those waivers according to their terms, leaving defendants with few options to challenge their convictions or sentences after pleading guilty. As a result, the scope of appeal waivers has been a bone of contention for defense lawyers throughout the United States. In Hunter v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the enforceability of appellate waivers, but also recognized an important exception when enforcing a waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.
The Case
Munson Hunter pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting wire fraud pursuant to a plea agreement containing a broad appellate waiver. At sentencing, the district court imposed a supervised-release condition requiring that he take all prescribed mental health medications. Although Hunter had waived most appellate rights, the district judge incorrectly advised him that he retained a right to appeal the condition regarding medication. Hunter later challenged the supervised release condition, arguing both that the medication condition was unconstitutional and that the court’s statement effectively nullified the waiver.
The Decision
Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan rejected the argument that the district court’s misstatement modified the plea agreement. The agreement expressly required any modification to be in writing, and the government’s failure to object to the court’s statement did not waive or forfeit its ability to enforce the appellate waiver. The Court emphasized that plea agreements remain contracts that generally will be enforced according to their terms.
A New ‘Miscarriage of Justice’ Exception
That said, a significant aspect of the decision is the Court’s adoption of a narrow miscarriage of justice exception to appellate waivers. Rejecting the government’s position that valid waivers must always be enforced, the Court held that appellate courts may review otherwise waived claims when enforcement would produce an extraordinary and fundamentally unjust result. Examples identified by the Court include sentences that exceed statutory limits, sentences infected by blatant constitutional violations, or proceedings that fundamentally undermine the integrity of the judicial process.
Why It Matters
Hunter resolves a longstanding circuit split and establishes a uniform federal standard governing appellate waiver. While the decision is unlikely to open the floodgates to routine sentencing appeals, it preserves a critical safeguard against extreme legal and constitutional errors. The government will continue to rely on appellate waivers, but defendants now have a narrow avenue to challenge sentences that cross the line from ordinary error to fundamental injustice.
The Supreme Court recently issued two significant decisions that curtail the scope of compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In Rutherford v. United States and Fernandez v. United States, the Court rejected efforts to use compassionate release as a vehicle to obtain relief from lengthy sentences based on subsequent changes in the law or perceived flaws in underlying convictions. Taken together, the decisions reinforce that compassionate release remains a narrow remedy focused primarily on an inmate’s personal circumstances rather than broader concerns about sentencing policy or guilt.
In Rutherford, the Court addressed a recurring issue arising from the First Step Act’s elimination of mandatory ‘stacking’ under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Before the First Step Act, defendants convicted of multiple § 924(c) counts (possession of a firearm during a “crime of violence” or “drug trafficking crime”) in a single prosecution often faced extraordinarily long mandatory sentences. Congress reduced those penalties in 2018 but declined to make the change fully retroactive. Defendant Rutherford argued that the disparity between the sentences they received and the sentences they would receive today constituted an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ warranting compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Barrett concluded that a sentencing disparity created by Congress’s decision not to make a sentencing amendment retroactive cannot itself qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. The Court reasoned that nonretroactivity is the norm in federal sentencing and that allowing courts to reduce sentences based on such disparities would undermine Congress’s deliberate choice regarding retroactivity. The Court further held that the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement authorizing relief for certain “unusually long sentences” conflicted with congressional intent and was invalid to that extent.
The same day, the Court decided Fernandez. There, the petitioner sought compassionate release based largely on his claim that he was innocent and that his conviction was unreliable. After losing on direct appeal and in post-conviction proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Fernandez attempted to obtain relief through the compassionate release statute. The district court granted relief, expressing doubts about the integrity of the conviction, but the Second Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit. Again, writing for the majority, Justice Barrett held that challenges to the validity of a conviction must proceed through the habeas and post-conviction framework established by Congress, particularly § 2255. According to the Court, allowing defendants to relitigate claims of innocence or trial error through compassionate release motions would permit an end-run around the procedural limitations Congress imposed on collateral attacks. The Court emphasized that compassionate release is intended to address circumstances such as age, illness, family hardship, and rehabilitation, not alleged legal defects in a conviction.
The practical takeaway from Rutherford and Fernandez is straightforward. Compassionate release is not a catch-all equitable remedy. Courts may not use § 3582(c)(1)(A) to revisit Congress’s decisions about retroactivity, nor may they use it to reconsider the validity of convictions that are properly challenged through habeasproceedings. While compassionate release remains an important mechanism for addressing extraordinary personal circumstances, the Supreme Court has made clear that it is not a substitute for legislative reform or post-conviction review.
Going forward, successful compassionate release motions are likely to remain focused on the traditional factors that have historically defined the remedy: age, medical condition, family circumstances, and other individualized hardships.
