That Dog Will Hunt – SCOTUS Rules That Government Need Not Demonstrate Record Of Accuracy Of Sniffing Dogs In The Field For Probable Cause

Posted On Monday, March 4, 2013

More than a few observers have made note of the increased use of so-called “blue collar” investigative techniques in white collar matters.  The most prominent instances of this practice recently have been the high profile insider trading prosecutions, which saw wide-spread use of confidential informants, wire taps and targeted searches.

These cases indicate the need for white collar practitioners to stay abreast of developments in precedent on 4th Amendment issues.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement on this front came in, of all circumstances, what was essentially a challenge to the qualifications of a drug sniffing dog named Aldo.  While we don’t see the prospect of dogs descending on Wall Street anytime soon, the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Harris, No. 11-817 (February 19, 2013), is worth reviewing. 

In Harris, the Supreme Court held that the state doesn’t have to present detailed records showing that a drug-sniffing dog has a history of accurately detecting the presence of drugs while on the job in order to demonstrate that probable cause existed for a search.  The case below centered on the traffic stop of Clayton Harris by K-9 officer, William Wheetley, because Harris had an expired license plate.  Wheetley observed that Harris was visibly nervous and that there was an open can of beer in the cup holder of the automobile.  Wheetley asked for and was denied permission to search the vehicle.  Wheetley then retrieved his canine, Aldo, from his patrol car and walked Aldo around the truck.  Aldo indicated that he smelled drugs on the driver’s side door handle.  Based principally on Aldo’s alert, Wheetley decided that he had probable cause to search the vehicle.  No drugs were found.  However, the ingredients for making methamphetamine, including pseudoephedrine, were located.

Harris subsequently admitted that he manufactured and used methamphetamine.  He was then charged with possessing pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing methamphetamine.  Unfortunately for Mr. Harris that was not the end of his difficulties, as he continued to be “dogged” by Wheetley and Aldo.  Specifically, while on bail, Harris was stopped by Wheetley again.  Aldo again alerted to the presence of drugs on the driver’s side door handle but nothing of interest was found during the search. 

Harris moved to supress evidence found during the search of his car on the grounds that Aldo’s alert did not provide probable cause.  At the hearing, Wheetley testified about the training he and Aldo had received in drug detection.  He also testified that he would hide drugs in certain buildings and vehicles and that Aldo did well on these tests.  The state also introduced training logs showing that Aldo always found hidden drugs and performed “satisfactorily” (the higher of two possible assessments) on each day of training.  Harris didn’t challenge Wheetley’s or Aldo’s training.  Rather, he focused on Aldo’s certification and performance in the field.  Wheetley conceded that Aldo’s certification had expired the year before the search and that he didn’t keep complete records of how Aldo performed while on patrol.

Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, went on to emphasize that probable cause is a fluid concept, turning on an evaluation of probabilities given the particular facts facing the officer.

The trial court concluded that Wheetley had probable cause for a search and denied the motion to suppress.  However, the Florida Supreme Court reversed.  In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court stressed the need for evidence of the dog’s performance history, including records showing how often the dog alerted in the field without illegal contraband being found.  Only if an officer kept complete records of his dog’s field performance would he or she have reason to believe that the dog was a reliable indicator of the presence of drugs.

In reviewing the matter, the Supreme Court noted that a police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him or her would warrant a reasonable person of reasonable caution to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.  Justice Kagan, writing for a unanimous Court, went on to emphasize that probable cause is a fluid concept, turning on an evaluation of probabilities given the particular facts facing the officer.  Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the Florida court violated this principle by creating a list of factors which must be met – most particularly, detailed records regarding a dog’s performance in the field – in order for a dog’s alert to provide probable cause for a search.

The Court noted that the fact that drugs aren’t found following a search doesn’t mean that the dog was wrong.  Rather, the officer may have failed to find the drugs because they were too well-hidden or present in amounts too small for the officer to locate.  The dog could have also been reacting to the fact that drugs had previously been present in the vehicle.  Additionally, an officer won’t know if a dog failed to alert where drugs were actually present because a search won’t take place.

It stated that these problems don’t exist where controlled tests are being performed because the people performing the tests will know where the drugs are and when the dog should alert.  Therefore, evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance during a testing program can provide sufficient reason to believe that the dog is reliable.  However, a defendant can challenge the adequacy of the testing program.  Additionally, even if a dog is generally trustworthy, a defendant can try to show that the circumstances surrounding a particular stop indicate that the dog’s alert wasn’t enough to create probable cause – for instance, if there is evidence that the officer did something to cause the dog to indicate that it detected the presence of drugs.

The Court ultimately concluded that the evidence presented regarding Aldo’s training and his ability to find drugs was enough to establish that he was reliable and his alert provided probable cause for the search of Harris’ vehicle.

A complete copy of the Court’s opinion can be found here: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-817_5if6.pdf

Supreme Court To SEC: No ‘Discovery Rule’ For You

Posted On Friday, March 1, 2013

The SEC doesn’t get the benefit of the “discovery rule” to toll the statute of limitations when suing for civil penalties from investment advisers accused of defrauding their clients, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled this week.

The ruling in Gabelli v. SEC, No. 11-1274 (Feb. 27, 2013), limits the government to five years to bring such cases.

In Gabelli, the SEC sought civil penalties against the chief operating officer and former portfolio manager of a mutual fund.  The government alleged that the defendants aided and abetted violations of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which bans investment advisors from defrauding clients or prospective clients.  The SEC filed the action in 2008, contending that the fraud took place between 1999 and 2002.

Citing the five-year statute of limitations for bringing actions for civil penalties, the defendants moved to dismiss the 6-to-9-year-old claims.  The government countered that because it alleged fraud by the defendants, the court should apply the “discovery rule,” a legal doctrine that keeps time from running on the statute of limitations until the point when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known it had been injured. 

The district court agreed with the defendants and dismissed the case; the Second Circuit sided with the government.

“Unlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out,” the Chief Justice wrote, “and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit.”

The Supreme Court reversed.  Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the discovery rule is meant to protect plaintiffs who would have no reason and likely no ability to investigate frauds perpetrated against them.  But the SEC is a different beast.

“Unlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out,” the Chief Justice wrote, “and it has many legal tools at hand to aid in that pursuit.”

The Court also concluded that the discovery rule is ill-suited for penalty actions, which seek not to compensate a victim but to punish the wrongdoer. 

Finally, the Court noted the inherent difficulty in applying the discovery rule to government actions, given the “hundreds of employees, dozens of offices, and several levels of leadership” in most agencies and the complexities inherent in establishing investigative priorities.  How exactly would a court determine when a reasonable government agency would have known of the fraud?

“Applying a discovery rule to Government penalty actions is far more challenging than applying the rule to suits by defrauded victims,” the Chief Justice wrote, “and we have no mandate from Congress to undertake that challenge here.” 

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