Is the Supreme Court Ready to End the Fifty-Five Year Old Bivens Doctrine?
By: Joshua D. Hill
Nielsen v. Watanabe puts the Bivens Doctrine back in the spotlight
On November 9, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Nielsen v. Watanabe, No. 25-417, a case that could decide whether individuals may still sue federal officers for money damages when those officers violate their constitutional rights. The dispute is modest on its facts: a federal prisoner says a prison nurse ignored his serious medical needs. However, the question the Court agreed to decide is not. It calls into question the survival of the remedy, recognized more than half a century ago in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for holding individual federal officials personally liable in damages for constitutional violations.
At argument, counsel for nurse Francis Nielsen urged the justices to abandon Bivens, maintaining that Congress, not the federal judiciary, has the authority to create damages remedies. Several justices weighed in, with Justice Brett Kavanaugh asking what weight to give Congress’s decades-long failure to displace the doctrine.
A Narrow Remedy with a Long History
42 U.S.C. § 1983 expressly authorizes damages actions against state and local officials who violate federal rights under color of state law. No comparably broad statute reaches individual federal officials. The Court filled that gap itself back in 1971, recognizing in Bivens an implied damages remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation by federal narcotics agents. But it has extended the remedy only twice since: to Fifth Amendment sex discrimination by a congressional employer in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and to Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to a federal prisoner’s serious medical needs in Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
For decades, the Court has refused to expand Bivens beyond these three distinct constitutional violations. In Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017), it directed courts to ask first whether a claim arises in a “new context” meaningfully different from the three the Court has recognized (discussed above), and then whether any “special factors” counsel hesitation before implying a remedy. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), tightened the screws further, holding that “if there is any reason to think Congress is better positioned to weigh the costs and benefits of a remedy, courts should stay their hand.” The practical result is that Bivens survives as a narrow exception, not a general constitutional tort.
The Dispute in Nielsen v. Watanabe
Kekai Watanabe suffered a fractured tailbone in an assault while in federal custody in Honolulu and was then denied adequate evaluation and treatment. He sued Francis Nielsen, a prison nurse, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the claim, but the Ninth Circuit allowed it to proceed, reasoning that it fit within Carlson‘s established prison-medical-care context. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether that ruling improperly recognized a Bivens cause of action.
Nielsen argues, inter alia, that Bivens rests on a discredited, mid-century approach to implying causes of action, and that fixing the scope of federal officials’ personal liability is a policy judgment for Congress and calls into question the judiciary’s power to create a damages remedy at all without congressional authorization.
Watanabe argues that Congress has had the opportunity to do away with Bivens, but has opted not to. Watanabe points to Congress’ enactment of the Westfall Act in 1988, substituting the United States for federal employees in many tort suits while expressly preserving claims against federal employees for constitutional violations. Congress later passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act, imposing exhaustion and other limits on prisoner suits. Those enactments, Watanabe argues, were built on the settled backdrop of Bivens and Carlson, evidence that Congress legislated around the remedy, not that it wanted the courts to abolish it.
What to Watch
The decision will show how this Court regards Bivens: as a precedent to be confined, a doctrine to be retired, or a limited remedy that Congress has effectively absorbed into the statutory landscape. The justices’ questions, about congressional silence, the line between injury and death, and the adequacy of alternative remedies, suggest they are weighing both doctrinal consistency and the practical consequences of closing the courthouse door to people injured by federal officials. For now, Bivens remains a sharply restricted avenue for relief. Nielsen v. Watanabe may decide whether it stays open at all and to whom.